On 2026-08-24 I shipped a change to the configuration that emits PyPI's download logs
so that only requests for actual distribution artifacts are counted.
A request has to end in .whl, .tar.gz, or .zip to produce a download record.
The counts are more accurate now, and existing systems based on PyPI's BigQuery dataset, like pypistats.org will display a different shape going forward.
Working on infrastructure at the Python Software Foundation (PSF) as the Director of Engineering is a broad job with many hats. Python turns up everywhere. It's in healthcare systems and government agencies, in research labs and classrooms, in one-person side projects and in infrastructure at companies with six-figure headcounts. Somebody is using it to analyze a genome right now and somebody else is using it to automate a spreadsheet they hate arranging by hand. That range has always been the interesting part of the PSF's work, and it's only broadened in the last couple of years as AI continues to pull people from many disciplines into writing Python.
PyPI has adopted PEP 833, which "freezes" the HTML representation of the index API, which is also sometimes called the "simple API" or the "simple repository API."
New packages and releases will continue to appear in the HTML representation, meaning this has no breaking implications for downstream index consumers.
However, future standardization and development efforts will focus on the JSON representation, and downstreams that consume only the HTML representation are strongly encouraged to transition to the JSON representation to ensure access to the latest and greatest index features.
The Python Package Index (PyPI) now rejects new files being uploaded to releases that are older than 14 days. This restriction was put in place to prevent old and long-stable releases from being poisoned in case publishing tokens or workflows of PyPI projects were compromised. As far as we are aware this has not yet been abused, but there is no technical reason beyond that attackers weren't aware it was possible.
Over the next few months, we will be rolling out changes to the PyPI user interface, improving how we surface security signals and updating the pages where users view package details.
Updates will be staged to TestPyPI and deployed to production in phases. This approach allows our team to thoroughly test the UI with production-like data, while providing the community with an opportunity to share feedback.
The first phase of changes is now staged on TestPyPI and ready for users to review!
In 2023 PyPI completed its first security audit, and I am proud to announce that we have now completed our second external security audit.
This work was funded by the Sovereign Tech Agency, a supporter of Open Source security-related improvements, partnering with Trail of Bits to perform the audit. Thanks to ongoing support from Alpha-Omega, my role at the PSF enabled me to focus on rapid remediation of the findings.
This time around, there's no three-part series, as the scope was narrower, focused only on PyPI's codebase and behaviors. Read on for a summary of issues identified, their resolutions, and more details about the audit process.
This post will drill deeper into two recent supply chain exploits, targeting users of popular PyPI packages - litellm & telnyx.
We also provide Python developers and maintainers with guidance on what they can do to prepare
and protect themselves from future incidents.
Hello there! I am Maria, the inaugural PyPI Support Specialist. I go by "Thespi-Brain" on GitHub. I wanted to provide a dispatch of how this past year (and a half!) has been regarding my role and PyPI. PyPI has now reached over a million users and has over 700,000 projects. It is, without a doubt, a critical part of the Python ecosystem. As the inaugural PyPI Support Specialist, there were numerous challenges that needed to be tackled regarding PyPI support, such as the ever growing backlog of account recovery and PEP 541 issues.
As 2025 comes to a close, it's time to look back at another busy year for the Python Package Index. This year, we've focused on delivering critical security enhancements, rolling out powerful new features for organizations, improving the overall user experience for the millions of developers who rely on PyPI every day, and responding to a number of security incidents with transparency.
An attack on the npm ecosystem continues to evolve, exploiting compromised accounts to publish malicious packages. This campaign, dubbed Shai-Hulud, has targeted large volumes of packages in the JavaScript ecosystem, exfiltrating credentials to further propagate itself.
PyPI has not been exploited, however some PyPI credentials were found exposed in compromised repositories. We've revoked these tokens as a precaution, there's no evidence they have been used maliciously. This post raises awareness about the attack and encourages proactive steps to secure your accounts, especially if you're using build platforms to publish packages to PyPI.